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Use of evidential reasoning for eliciting Bayesian subjective probabilities in human 
reliability analysis: a maritime case  
 
Abstract  
Modelling the interdependencies among the factors influencing human error (e.g. the common 
performance conditions (CPCs) in Cognitive Reliability Error Analysis Method (CREAM)) stimulates 
the use of Bayesian Networks (BNs) in Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). However, subjective 
probability elicitation for a BN is often a daunting and complex task. To create conditional probability 
values for each given variable in a BN requires a high degree of knowledge and engineering effort, 
often from a group of domain experts. This paper presents a novel hybrid approach for incorporating 
the evidential reasoning (ER) approach with BNs to facilitate HRA under incomplete data. The kernel 
of this approach is to develop the best and the worst possible conditional subjective probabilities of the 
nodes representing the factors influencing HRA when using BNs in human error probability (HEP). 
The proposed hybrid approach is demonstrated by using CREAM to estimate HEP in the maritime area. 
The findings from the hybrid ER-BN model can effectively facilitate HEP analysis in specific and 
decision-making under uncertainty in general. 
Keywords: Human reliability analysis, human error probability, evidential reasoning, Bayesian 
network, maritime risk.  
1. Introduction  
The second generation Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods such as the Cognitive Reliability 
and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) (Hollnagel, 1998) were used to proactively assess the erroneous 
human actions in complicated systems in a way that the context influencing human action is 
appropriately taken into account. While facilitating the quantitative development of HRA, these 
methods exposed some problems in their practical applications. For instance, the prospective 
assessment model of the basic approach to estimate human error probability (HEP) in CREAM 
(Hollnagel, 1998) cannot provide a crisp value of the consequences of human performance, and the 
HEP estimation mechanism is not sensitive to minor changes associated with the nine common  
performance conditions (CPCs) in CREAM (Yang et al., 2013; Xi et al., 2017). A fuzzy Bayesian 
reasoning approach was developed to deal with this problem through using Bayesian Networks (BNs) 
to model the parent-child relationship between the CPCs and Contextual Control Model Controlling 
Modes (COCOM-CMs) in CREAM (Yang et al., 2013; Abujaafar et al., 2016). However, it requires 
too much information about the prior conditional probabilities assigned to the node of COCOM-CMs, 
jeopardising the applicability of the approach. Furthermore, Bayesian inference requires probability 
completeness. Subjective judgements are usually used to complement the unavailability of statistical 
data. Even though subjective probabilities can be elicited by experts, it often raises the problems relating 
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to accuracy, consensus and completeness of judgements. The evidential reasoning (ER) approach (Yang 
and Xu, 2002) has shown its attractiveness to tackle the high uncertainty in data (e.g. incompleteness) 
associated with subjective judgements and has therefore been used to synthesise experts’ estimates in 
HRA (Xi et al., 2017). However, so far the two challenging but essential features of uncertain data in 
HRA, interdependency among performance factors and incompleteness in subjective estimates have not 
been simultaneously addressed with success, in order for effective solutions to be found. Obviously, 
such incomplete probabilities can be effectively elicited by incorporating partial degrees of belief. In 
this regard, an ER algorithm has been developed on the basis of the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of 
evidence (Dempster, 1968; Shafer, 1976), which can be well suited to modelling subjective credibility 
induced by partial evidence observation (Smets, 1988). The ER’s synthesising capability of partial 
degrees of belief has enlarged the utilisation scope of the traditional probabilistic theory, particularly in 
describing and handling uncertain information (e.g. incompleteness and ignorance) by using the concept 
of degrees of belief (Yang et al., 2008; Wan et al., 2019). Therefore, it is proposed to be integrated with 
BNs in this research to tackle the incapability of BNs in modelling incomplete, subjective probabilities 
introduced by multiple experts.  
This paper presents a new hybrid approach for combining an ER algorithm with BNs in a 
complementary way, taking into account both interdependent performance factors and incomplete 
subjective data simultaneously. The kernel of the proposed method is that two individual assessment 
scenarios involving the best and worst evaluation models for all the nodes of incomplete subjective 
probabilities, are created, in which the remaining probability masses (due to incompleteness) of the 
nodes are assigned back to their best (i.e. that contributes to the lowest HEP) and worst (i.e. that 
contributes to the highest HEP) grades, homogeneously and respectively. To achieve the above aim, the 
literature on the use of conventional CREAM and the development of the extended CREAM are 
reviewed to reveal the associated weaknesses and formulate the research problems in Section 2. In 
Section 3, a new hybrid approach by combining ER and BNs is developed to overcome the problems 
identified. Its applicability and feasibility are demonstrated by an illustrative example for easy 
understanding of the relevant mathematical algorithms in Section 4 and by studying the Deepwater 
Horizon accident case in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the achieved results. 
2. Literature review  
2.1 Traditional CREAM method 
To model the causal relations, the CREAM methodology has been derived from its core, the Contextual 
Control Model (COCOM). COCOM focuses on the principle that human performance is the outcome 
of the purposive use of competence adjusted to specific working conditions rather than of the pre-
determined sequence of response to given events (Yang et al., 2013). As one of the most widely known 
‘second generation’ HRA methods, CREAM presents a consistent error classification system that 
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integrates individual, technological and organizational factors. The classification describes the relations 
between causes and effects by defining a number of sub-groups and tables, which are provided for the 
error modes on the one hand and the organisational causes on the other. As a kind of context-related 
HRA method, CREAM provides an approach to the assessment of cognitive processes during 
emergencies, and thus it has been widely recognised and used in the analysis of marine accidents. 
Among the recent examples are Zhou et al. (2017) and Ung (2018). However, CREAM (both basic and 
extended methods) has exposed certain practical limitations in its applications especially in the maritime 
industry. The failure rate intervals of Human Failure Probability (HFP) values from the basic method 
appear to be unacceptably wide even for the use in screening (Fujita and Hollnagel, 2004). It is also 
difficult to further use and interpret such failure rate intervals in practice. The extended method uses 
the output from the basic CREAM and appropriate data sources to calculate the probability of each 
cognitive function failure (Hollnagel, 1998). Lack of critical mass in statistical failure data, however, 
proves the tasks of adapting the extended method in the maritime area to be challenging (Xi et al., 
2017). All of these limitations stimulate the development of advanced techniques in CREAM. 
2.2 Extensions of CREAM with uncertainty treatment techniques 
Over the past decade, advanced quantification approaches for HEP in CREAM have been proposed by 
using different uncertainty treatment techniques including fuzzy logic (Ung, 2015), BNs (Marseguerra 
et al. 2007), and ER (Xi et al., 2017). Kim et al. (2006) proposed a probabilistic method by using 
Bayesian networks for a better estimation of the control mode, which is able to produce mathematically 
correct results when levels of CPCs are given probabilistically. Konstandinidou et al. (2006) developed 
a fuzzy classification system for the estimation of the probability of human erroneous actions according 
to CREAM. The results obtained were in the form of crisp numbers, which can be used directly in other 
risk analysis models (e.g. fault tree model) for the quantification of specific undesired events. Although 
some attractiveness is observed in terms of the enhancement of CREAM in certain specific aspects 
though involving one (or some) of these uncertainty treatment techniques, a number of practical 
problems are still exposed. Examples of such problems include the loss of useful information in fuzzy 
Max–Min inference operations, lack of adequacy of modelling CPC dependencies and of instant human 
failure probability estimation, and inability of incorporating different effects/importance on human 
performance that CPCs may have in the practical HRA applications.  
In view of the above-mentioned concerns, Yang et al. (2013) developed a generic BN-based HRA 
methodology, in which the prospective analysis of CREAM is modified, to facilitate the quantification 
of maritime human failures by effectively incorporating both fuzzy logic and Bayesian inference 
mechanisms. The framework has used fuzzy IF-THEN rule bases with belief structures and BNs to 
aggregate all the rules associated with a seafarer’s task in order to estimate his/her failure probability. 
However, it is realised that large BNs of multi-tier nodes often exist in application domains. Their 
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complexity is sometimes beyond the current knowledge of domain experts. In addition, conventional 
mathematical methods are simply not applicable. Therefore, heuristic methods based on ‘causal linkage’ 
rather than detailed equations present a feasible way to proceed at present (McErleani et al., 1999). It is 
particularly important when the aforementioned BN-based HRA models fail to cope with situations 
where incomplete conditional probabilities are raised/assigned by multiple experts.  
3. Methodology 
Use of the ER-BN approach in HRA is demonstrated through its application in the CREAM framework 
given that BNs have been widely used in CREAM-based HRA modelling due to their feature, which 
takes into account the interaction between the nine CPCs (which are “Adequacy of organisation (#1)”, 
“Working conditions (#2)”, “Adequacy of man-machine interface and operational support (#3)”, 
“Availability of procedures and plans (#4)”, “Number of simultaneous goals (#5)”, “Available time 
(#6)”, “Time of day (#7)”, “Adequacy of training and experience (#8)” and “Crew collaboration quality 
(#9)”). In this research, the proposed ER-BN model consists of the following four steps: 
Step 1. The rule base of modelling probabilistic causal relation between parent-child nodes in the BN-
based CREAM (e.g. Figure 2) is developed (Yang et al., 2013; Abujaafar et al., 2016). It reflects 
the interaction among the nine CPCs originally defined in CREAM (Hollnagel, 1998). During 
this process, the conditional probabilities of the parent-child nodes are elicited in either a 
complete or incomplete format by a group of domain experts.  
Step 2. The ER approach (Yang and Xu, 2002) is used to synthesise the complete/incomplete 
conditional probabilities and aggregate the child nodes’ conditional probabilities that are 
symmetrically affected by the nodes associated with the nine CPCs.  
Step 3. The unknown/remaining probability masses (i.e. the unassigned probabilities to the grades of 
the child node) due to incomplete judgements are assigned back to the best (i.e. that contributes 
to the lowest HEP) and worst (i.e. that contributes to the highest HEP) grades of the nodes. Two 
BN models, representing the best scenario in which all the remaining probability masses of the 
nodes having unknown probabilities are assigned to the best grades of their corresponding 
nodes, and the worst scenarios in which they are assigned to the worst grades of the nodes, are 
constructed respectively.  
Step 4. The two results from the best and worst scenarios are aggregated to obtain a crisp HEP using 
ER. Different weights can be assigned to the results obtained from the best and worst scenarios 
to present the HEPs in a range from optimistic to pessimistic perspectives.  
3.1 Developing the rule base of modelling parent-child nodes and eliciting the complete or incomplete 
degrees of belief of COCOM-CMs  
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To assess HEP, it requires the evaluation of the CREAM context through the effect levels of the nine 
CPCs. By using a BN, it is possible to graphically map the nine CPCs in a convergent connection to 
infer the probabilities of the COCOM-CMs (in which the four characteristic control modes are 
“Scrambled”, “Opportunistic”, “Tactical” and “Strategic” ). In this context, each CPC is described by a 
number of discrete states including four states for three CPCs and three states for the remaining six 
CPCs, according to the original CREAM. Different levels of each CPC along with their individual effect 
on human performance are described in Table 1, and the relation between CPCs and the control modes 
is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Table 1. Description of CPCs and associated linguistic variables (Hollnagel, 1998) 
CPC  CPC Levels Effects  
#1 Adequacy of organisation Deficient  
Inefficient 
Efficient  
Very Efficient  
Negative 
Negative 
Neutral 
Positive 
#2 Working Conditions Incompatible  
Compatible  
Advantageous  
Negative 
Neutral 
Positive 
#3 Adequacy of man machine interface 
(MMI) and operational support 
Inappropriate  
Tolerable  
Adequate  
Supportive  
Negative 
Neutral 
Neutral 
Positive 
#4 Availability of procedures and plans Inappropriate  
Acceptable  
Appropriate  
Negative 
Neutral 
Positive 
#5 Number of simultaneous goals More than actual capacity  
Matching current capacity 
Fewer than actual capacity 
Negative 
Neutral 
Neutral  
#6 Available time Continuously inadequate  
Temporarily inadequate  
Adequate  
Negative 
Neutral 
Positive 
#7 Time of day Night (0:00-7:00hr) (unadjusted)  
Night (17:00-24:00hr) (unadjusted)   
Day (6:00-18:00hr) (adjusted)  
Negative 
Negative 
Neutral 
#8 Adequacy of training and experience Inadequate  
Adequate with limited experience  
Adequate with high experience  
Negative 
Neutral 
Positive 
#9 Crew collaboration quality Deficient  
Inefficient  
Efficient  
Very efficient   
Negative 
Neutral 
Neutral 
Positive 
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Figure 1. The relation between CPCs and control modes (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 
Such convergent connection will result in 46,656 (43×36) discrete conditional probabilities to be 
assigned. The configuration of such a large number of discrete conditional probabilities subjectively by 
domain experts will be of great difficulty. Therefore a divorcing method is introduced to simplify the 
task of assigning subjective probabilities by adding three attributes (the second tier) and two sub-
attributes (the third tier) shown in Figure 2. The three attributes (nodes) are “Action load”, “Working 
environment” and “Operator preparedness” directly influencing COCOM-CMs’ probability 
(Marseguerra et al., 2007). Each attribute is associated with different CPCs according to the reasoning 
in CPCs’ evaluation by Hollnagel (1998). The attribute “Working environments” is influenced by five 
CPCs. To further simplify its conditional probability table (CPT) assignment, two new sub-attributes, 
“Adequacy of working culture” and “Adequacy of perception conditions” are also introduced. The 
CPTs of the attributes and sub-attributes are assigned based on the uniformly defined states, 
“Inappropriate”, “Acceptable” and “Appropriate” which present the reduced, satisfactory and improved 
effects to human reliability, with respect to the defined grades of the nine CPCs in CREAM. A divorcing 
concept has no significant effect on modelling mathematical inference if attributes and sub-attributes’ 
CPTs are assigned properly (Kim et al., 2006). The use of a divorcing concept simplifies the assignment 
of CPTs of the developed BN-based CREAM model. It also makes it possible to introduce fuzzy rule 
bases (FRB) to facilitate the elicitation of subjective CPTs of the child nodes. For example, the 
interactive logical relation between the effect levels of the three attributes “Action load (A)”, “Working 
environments (W)” and “Operator preparedness (O)”, and the COCOM-CMs is described as follows 
while the CPT of the COCOM-CMs under the three parents is established in Table 5. The interaction 
among the nine CPCs (at the fifth and sixth tiers) and their relationship with the four adjusted CPCs (at 
the fourth tier) are modelled based on the original CREAM method (Hollnagel, 1998). Since the 
development of this part (Tier 4 to Tier 6) of the network has been described in Yang et al., (2013), it 
is not repeated in this paper.   
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Figure 2. BN based CREAM generic model for human performance reliability assessment  
To model the interactive relations between the new attributes and COCOM-CMs in a logical form, 
fuzzy logic can be used to construct IF-THEN rules. Each of IF-THEN rules includes two parts: an 
antecedent that responds to the fuzzy input of the three attributes (each of which has three grades) and 
a consequence associated with the COCOMs’ four control modes as the fuzzy output. In this study, a 
collection of multiple-input multiple-output FRB (consisting of 27 rules (i.e. 3×3×3)) is defined as 
follows (Yang et al., 2009; 2010):  
 
𝑅𝑙: IF 𝐿1
𝑘,𝑙 and 𝐿2
𝑘,𝑙 and 𝐿3
𝑘,𝑙, THEN ( 𝛽1,𝑙,  𝛽2,𝑙 ,  𝛽3,𝑙 ,  𝛽4,𝑙)                                (1) 
    
In a fuzzy rule 𝑅𝑙 (l = 1, 2, …, 27), if the input satisfies the antecedent linguistic vector(s) 𝐿𝑟
𝑘,𝑙 (𝑟 = 1, 
2, 3; l = 1, 2, …, 27; k = 1, 2, 3), the output 𝛽𝑗,𝑙 (𝑗 =1, 2, 3, 4; l = 1, 2, …, 27) represents the belief 
degree(s) to which a control mode  𝐷𝑗 (𝑗 =1, 2, 3 or 4)  is believed to be the consequence. Linguistic 
vector 𝐿𝑟
𝑘,𝑙  is defined with its nature of having “Appropriate” (improved), “Acceptable” (not 
significant) or “Inappropriate” (reduced) effects on COCOM-CMs. Obviously, if 𝐿1
𝑘,𝑙
 is “Action load”, 
then 𝐿1
𝑘,𝑙 can be any of the three linguistic variables used to describe “Action load”, which are 
Inappropriate (𝐿1
1,𝑙), Acceptable (𝐿1
2,𝑙), and Appropriate (𝐿1
3,𝑙). The following illustrative rule is 
developed to interpret the rules with a belief structure. 
 R2: IF the “Action load” is Inappropriate AND the “Working environments” are Appropriate 
AND “Operator preparedness” is Inappropriate, THEN the belief degrees of operator COCOM-
CM would be 0% “Strategic”, 0% “Tactical”, 10% “Opportunistic”, and 90% “Scrambled”.  
It can be further simplified and presented as:  
Adequacy of organisation
Deficient
Inefficient
Efficient
VeryEfficient
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
Operator preparedness
Inappropriate
Acceptable
Appropriate
33.3
33.3
33.3
Human action performance
Strategic
Tactical
Opportunistic
Scrambled
21.2
25.7
29.4
23.7
Working environment
Inappropriate
Acceptable
Appropriate
37.8
32.8
29.4
Adequacy of working culture
Inappropriate
Acceptable
Appropriate
39.1
32.8
28.1
Adjusted availabe Time
ContinuouslyInadequate
TemporarilyInadeqate
Adequate
35.4
31.3
33.3
  Adjusted number of simultaneous goals
MoreThanActualCapacity
MatchingCurrentCapacity
FewerThanActualCapacity
48.1
25.9
25.9
Number of simultaneous goals 
MoreThanActualCapacity
MatchingCurrentCapacity
FewerThanActualCapacity
33.3
33.3
33.3
Working Conditions 
Incompatible
Compatible
Advantageous
33.3
33.3
33.3
Available time 
ContinuouslyInadeqate
TemporarilyInadequate
Adequate
33.3
33.3
33.3
Adequacy of perception of conditions
Inappropriate
Acceptable
Appropriate
36.6
32.7
30.6
Action load
Inappropriate
Acceptable
Appropriate
42.0
28.2
29.8
Adjusted Crew collaboration quality
Deficient
Inefficient
Efficient
Veryefficient
29.2
20.8
20.8
29.2
Adequacy of training and experience 
Inadequate
AdequateWithLimitedExperie...
AdequateWithHighExperience
33.3
33.3
33.3
Crew collaboration quality
Deficient
Inefficient
Efficient
VeryEfficient
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
Time of day
NightAMunadjusted
DayAdjusted
NightPMunadjusted
33.3
33.3
33.3
Availability of procedures and plans
Inappropriate
Acceptable
Appropriate
33.3
33.3
33.3
Adequacy of man machine interface
Inappropriate
Tolerable
Adequate
Supportive
25.0
25.0
25.0
25.0
Adjusted working conditions
Incompatible
Compatible
Advantageous
35.0
31.5
33.6
8 
 
 R2: IF 𝐿1
1
, AND 𝐿2
1
, AND 𝐿3
2
, THEN ( 𝐷1, 0), ( 𝐷2, 0), ( 𝐷3, 0.1), ( 𝐷4, 0.9) 
where each 𝐿𝑟
𝑘,2 (𝑟 = 1, 2, 3; k = 1, 2, 3) in Rule 2 indicates the 𝑘th linguistic variable descriptor 
associated with the rth attribute. The set of degrees of belief  𝛽𝑗,2  (𝑗 =1, 2, 3, 4) = (0, 0, 0.1, 0.9) 
represents the combined subjective conditional probabilities from domain experts. The way of 
calculating  𝛽𝑗.𝑙 is given in Section 3.2.2. Such a rule base represents the possible functional mappings 
of uncertainty between the three new attributes and the four control modes. It provides a more 
informative, realistic scheme than a simple IF-THEN rule base does on uncertain knowledge 
representation. However, the challenge lies in the incompleteness knowledge encounters by the experts 
when assigning degrees of belief in the rule base modelling the relation among O, A, W and COCOMs. 
In other words, the problem appears in a situation, where the sum of the elicited degrees of belief is less 
than 1. In order to incorporate them into the estimate of COCOM-CMs probabilities in a convergent 
connection of a BN, the synthesizing capability of the ER algorithm is investigated accordingly. 
3.2 Synthesising the complete and incomplete expert judgements’ degrees of belief 
In order to investigate the capability of the ER approach in synthesising incomplete assessments, a 
hierarchy of two levels of attributes is considered, where the upper level represents the synthesised 
states 𝐷𝑗 (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) of the child node (i.e. COCOM), and the lower level represents the states of the 
parent nodes (i.e. O, A, W) that are denoted by 𝐿𝑟
𝑘   (𝑟 = 1,2, 3; 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3).  
In this respect, the assessment of the conditional probability 𝛽𝑗 
𝑖  of 𝐷𝑗 (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) by the ith expert 
𝐸𝑖  from a group of 𝑀 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑀) conditional on 𝐿𝑟
𝑘  mathematically, is represented by the 
following distribution:  
 𝑃(𝐸𝑖 | 𝐿𝑟
𝑘) = ( 𝐷𝑗 ,
i
j ), (𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝑀; 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, 4; 𝑟 = 1, 2, 3; 𝑘 = 1, 2, 3 )                         (2) 
where,  0 ≤
i
j ≤ 1, ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑖4
𝑗=1 ≤ 1  and 
i
j denotes a conditional degree of belief assigned to the jth state 
of the COCOM-CMs node by the ith expert. The above distribution reads that the conditional probability 
𝛽𝑗 of the child node has been subjectively assessed using the evaluation grade(s) 𝐷𝑗 distinctively and 
conditionally on the parents’ evaluation grades 𝐿𝑟
𝑘 combined with a conditional degree of belief  
i
j . 
An assessment by 𝐸𝑖 is complete if 

4
1j
i
j = 1  and incomplete if 

4
1j
i
j < 1. Such partial or complete 
ignorance is not rare in many distinctive evaluation problems. 
Suppose the importance or the relative weight of the expert 𝐸𝑖  is given by the weight 𝜔𝑖 (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀) 
with the condition that 0 ≤ 𝜔𝑖 ≤ 1. In this regard, the relative importance of 𝐸𝑖  plays an important role 
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in a group assessment. Collectively, 𝜔𝑖   (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑀) has to be normalized for the consistency of 
the assessment. 
To capture the non-linear relationship between different experts 𝑬𝒊 (i = 1, 2, …, M), the ER approach 
is used to combine all 
i
j  (j = 1, 2, 3, 4) from each 𝑬𝒊  and generate a final conclusion. Having 
represented belief degree distributions
i
j , the ER approach can be implemented as follows. First, it is 
required to transform the degrees of belief 
i
j  for all j = 1, 2, 3, 4, and i = 1, 2, …, M into basic 
probability masses using the following equations (Yang and Xu, 2002; Liu et al., 2005): 
i
ji
i
j wm  ,                                                                                                                                      (3) 



4
1
4
1
11
j
i
ji
j
i
j
i
D wmm  ,                                                                                                         (4) 
,1 i
i
D wm                                                                                                                                       (5) 








 

4
1
1~
j
i
ji
i
D wm  , for all j = 1, 2, 3, 4 and i = 1, 2, …, M.                                                         (6) 
where 
i
jm  are individual degrees to which 𝐸𝑖  supports the final synthesised conclusion D; iw  
represents the relevant importance of 𝐸𝑖  and thus 1
1


M
i
iw  ; and 
i
D
i
D
i
D mmm
~  for all i = 1, 2, …, M. 
The probability mass of 𝐸𝑖 ( iDm ) unassigned to the final synthesised conclusion D, which is unassigned 
to any individual output variables Dj, is split into two parts, one caused by the relative importance of 𝐸𝑖 
( i
Dm ), and the other due to the incompleteness of the belief degree assessment 
i
j  ( iDm~ ). 
Then, it is possible to aggregate all the outputs from 𝐸𝑖 (i = 1, 2, …, M) to generate the combined degree 
of belief ( j ) in each possible Dj of D. Suppose mj
C(i) is the combined belief degree in Dj by aggregating 
all the outputs from the M experts and mD
C(i) is the remaining belief degree unassigned to any Dj. Let 
mj
C(1) = mj
1 and mD
C(1) = mD
1. Then the overall combined belief degree in Dj is generated as follows (Liu 
et al., 2005).  
{Dj}: ][
1)(1)(1)(
)1(
)1( 

  ij
iC
D
i
D
iC
j
i
j
iC
jiC
iC
j mmmmmmKm                                                             (7) 
)()()( ~ iC
D
iC
D
iC
D mmm  , i = 1, 2, …, M – 1                                                                              (8)  
{D}: ]
~~~~[~
1)(1)(1)(
)1(
)1( 

  iD
iC
D
i
D
iC
D
i
D
iC
DiC
iC
D mmmmmmKm                                                                 (9) 
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][
1)(
)1(
)1( 

  iD
iC
DiC
iC
D mmKm                                                                                                (10)  
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where j  indicates the normalised belief degree assigned to Dj in the final synthesised conclusion D 
and D  represents the normalised remaining belief degree unassigned to any Dj. 
3.3 Distributing the unassigned probability masses in the COCOM-CMs BN to obtain a HEP interval 
The unassigned probability mass βD caused by the incompleteness of judgements is assigned back to 
𝐵1 (i.e. Strategic) representing the best scenario with the lowest possible HEP and to 𝐵4 (i.e. Scrambled) 
indicating the worst scenario with the highest possible HEP, respectively. Similarly, all the unassigned 
probability masses of the other child nodes in Figure 2 are assigned to their own CPTs with respect to 
the best and worst scenarios. Consequently, two individual COCOM BNs are established, from which 
the CPTs associated with the best and worst cases will be used to calculate the lowest and highest HEP 
values. The highest and lowest HEPs can be used as the two limits of an interval. It reflects the fact that 
the HEP analysis with incomplete input delivers its values in an interval, in which the actual HEP exists.  
3.4 HEP quantification and ranking 
To quantify the human failures, each Dj (j = 1, …, 4) requires the assignment of an appropriate utility 
value UDj. The values can be obtained by using a Weighted Mean of Maximum (WMoM) method as 
2.24 × 10-4, 0.01, 0.0708 and 0.316, respectively (Yang et al., 2013). A new HEP index can be calculated 
as: 
∑
4
1

j
Dj j
UHEP                                                                                                                             (14) 
The larger the value of HEP is, the lower the reliability level of human performance. However using 
Eq 14, the highest and lowest HEPs with respect to the best and worst scenarios can only construct a 
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HEP interval. Human action is more reliable than the other if and only if its highest value is smaller 
than the lowest one of the other. It is worth noting that such an approach is not preferred for a ranking 
purpose. A new coefficient, α, is introduced to indicate evaluators’ perception on the two sets of  βj (i.e. 

j and 

j ) with regards to the best and worst scenarios. More specifically, α means the extent to which 
the evaluators believe the HEP belongs to the best scenario and 1- α represents the extent to which HEP 
belongs to the worst scenario. If the evaluators are optimistic, α = 1 and the final HEP is the lower limit 
of the HEP interval. If the evaluators are pessimistic, α = 0 and the final HEP is the upper limit for the 
HEP interval. If 0<α<1, the final HEP can be calculated by using Eq. 15.  
  

 jjj  )1(                                                                                                                 (15) 
where ∪ means the combination of the two sets by the ER algorithm in Eqs. 3 - 13 and α is set as 0.5 
when the evaluators are neutral. The final crisp HEP is then calculated by applying the combined βj to 
Eq. 14.   
4. Case study of proposed methods in the Deepwater Horizon accident 
In this section, a case study of the Deepwater Horizon accident is conducted to illustrate the feasibility 
and applicability of the hybrid ER-BN model in facilitating the HEP analysis, and the evaluation results 
are compared with those obtained from traditional CREAM methods. The main reasons of using the 
proposed ER-BN model to investigate the Deepwater Horizon accident include that 1) there were 
several main governing factors symmetrically affecting the effect levels of the nine CPCs over the whole 
period of the drilling operations, and 2) the uncertainty associated with the available information during 
the final stages of drilling operations was high. 
4.1 Background information of the Deepwater Horizon accident 
In the evening of April 20, 2010, a well control event allowed hydrocarbons to escape from Macondo 
well onto Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon, resulting in explosions and fire on the rig. 11 people lost 
their lives, and 17 others were injured. The fire, which was caused by the hydrocarbons from the well, 
continued for 36 hours until the rig sank. Hydrocarbons continued to flow from the reservoir through 
the wellbore and the Blow Out Preventer (BOP) for 87 days, causing a spill of a national significance. 
Deepwater Horizon was located approximately 50 miles south of Venice, LA at Mississippi Canyon 
252. The accident on April 20, 2010, involved a well integrity failure, followed by a loss of hydrostatic 
control of the well. This followed a failure to control the flow from the well with the BOP equipment, 
which allowed the release and the subsequent ignition of hydrocarbons. Ultimately, the BOP emergency 
functions failed to seal the well after the initial explosions (BP, 2010). 
4.2 Aggregating multi attribute effects on the root cause nodes (i.e. the nine CPCs) 
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The evaluation of CPCs in this case study is based on the accident investigation team’s analysis results 
specifically presented in Appendix T of the Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (BP, 
2010). The report describes the relevant practices, procedures, and expectations, comparing them with 
the rig crew’s actions in monitoring the Macondo well and managing the well control event on 20 April 
2010. It includes the documents that governed the drilling operations on board the Deepwater Horizon 
at the time of the accident; the available real-time data; and the witness account interview. In this 
respect, Table 2 summarizes the specified functional assessment attributes, the identified evidence, and 
their evaluation.  
Table 2. Identified relevant practices, procedures, and expectations of rig crew’s actions in monitoring the 
Macondo well and managing the well control event on 20 April 2010 
 
Functional assessment 
attributes  
Investigation team review results 
Identified evidence Evaluation 
1 
 
Task 
responsibilities 
 
The manager was not clearly 
defined  
The investigation team could not 
verify whether anyone fitted the 
description of manager or had task 
responsibilities, and who should have 
made enquiries regarding the results 
of the negative pressure test that had 
been conducted to prove that the well 
structure integrity was intact at the 
time the negative pressure test results 
were concluded. 
The well driller’s responsibility is 
to detect a well control situation 
and shut down the well quickly, 
and to minimize the kick size used 
to enhance the safety of a well 
control operation. 
Neither the driller nor the tool-pusher 
realized that there were impending 
well control events. 
 
2 
Preparation  
procedures  
The review of well control 
preparation procedures has not 
occurred 
There is no evidence. 
 
3 
 
 
Prevention  
 
P
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
On April 20, 2010 between 13:28 
and 17:17 hours drilling mud fluid 
volume monitoring equipment was 
not properly used; in addition, it 
was not known what equipment 
they were using. 
Pressure and flow variations should 
have been available that would have 
indicated an abnormality with the oil 
well. In this regard, “extreme caution” 
could include factors such as pressure 
changes and flow increases. It would 
also include isolated individual 
volume monitoring to enhance well 
structure intact integrity. 
13 
 
W
it
n
es
s 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 1
 
 
On April 20, 2010 from 13:28 hours 
to 17:17 hours, mud was transferred 
to the supply vessel. Transferring 
mud from the pits to the supply 
vessel impaired the ability of mud-
loggers to reliably monitor the pit 
levels. Mud-logger stated this 
concern was raised with the 
assistant driller. The response was 
that the assistant driller would 
notify him when the mud transfer 
was completed and monitoring 
could resume. Mud-logger indicated 
that this notification did not occur 
after mud transfer to the supply 
vessel stopped at 17:17 hours.  
Mud-logger did not effectively 
monitor pit volumes for the 
remainder of that day. 
 
 
 
W
it
n
es
s 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 2
 There is no evidence to suggest that 
either the driller or assistant driller 
was monitoring the well mud fluid 
volumes and flow. Although mud-
loggers’ well monitoring equipment 
was installed and working, it was 
apparently not being used due to 
mud transfer to the supply vessel 
and mud pit cleaning activities. 
A more timely response to well 
conditions may have occurred if 
“constant, accurate observation and 
recording of mud volume” was 
implemented as defined in high 
pressure high temperature drilling 
guide lines stated in the documents 
governing the drilling operation. 
4 
 
Detection  
P
ro
ce
d
u
re
s 
Mud pumps were stopped at 21:31 
on April 20, 2010, but the driller and 
the tool-pusher both apparently 
were trying to understand the 
deferential pressure just prior to the 
accident.  
Neither the driller nor the tool-pusher 
realized that there was an impending 
well control event. 
R
ea
l-
ti
m
e 
d
at
a 
1
 
There was an increase in return flow 
from the well at 20:58 hours on 
April 20, 2010, approximately 51 
minutes before the first explosion. 
However, drill pipe pressure also 
increased and went unnoticed. The 
real time data indicts that a 39 bbl 
gain was taken in the mud pits at 
that time.  
Interim reports and the real time data 
indicate that the trip tank was being 
emptied at that time. This may have 
masked the volume change caused by 
flow from the well. 
R
ea
l-
ti
m
e 
d
at
a 
2
 At 21:08 hours on April 20, 2010, 
pumping was stopped, and the sheen 
test intended to indicate the 
presence of free oil was performed 
on the spacer returning from the 
well. From this time forward, the 
fluid returning from the well was 
discharged overboard.  
If the driller’s flow metre had been 
operating properly, increasing return 
flow would have been detected at this 
time. 
R
ea
l-
ti
m
e 
d
at
a 
3
 
While fluids were being discharged 
overboard, the mud loggers’ flow 
meter bypassed. 
The mud loggers were unable to 
monitor flow. 
 
W
it
n
es
s 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 1
 Mud-logger indicated that mud flow 
would not be seen if the flow 
diverter was activated or going 
through the dump line. The mud 
logging system is far more accurate. 
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R
ea
l-
ti
m
e 
d
at
a 
4
 
Real-time data indicates that 
circulation continued after flow 
increased and pump pressure 
fluctuated between 20:58 hours and 
21:31 hours.  
By the time the mud pumps were shut 
down at 21:31hours, an estimated 
300bbl gain had been taken into the 
wellbore and the well was flowing. 
R
ea
l-
ti
m
e 
d
at
a 
5
 
Well flow modelling indicates that 
between 21:36 hours and 21:38 
hours a valve was opened and 
closed on the rig floor, presumably 
to bleed off pressure from the drill 
pipe.  
Based on wetness accounts, the 
investigation team concluded that this 
occurred approximately 4 minutes 
before mud started flowing onto the 
rig floor. 
W
it
n
es
s 
ac
co
u
n
ts
 2
 
 
Mud was seen shooting all the way 
up to the derrick for several seconds, 
and then it just quit and went down 
for several seconds after that, and 
then all of a sudden the degasser 
mud started to come out of the 
degasser very strongly onto the 
deck. Mud flow volume through the 
rotary table at the surface was 
significant. 
Based on the procedure defined for 
equipment handling gas in the riser, 
the mud flow should have been routed 
overboard. Instead, the mud flow was 
routed through the mud gas separator. 
Based on gas dispersion and explosion 
analyses, the investigation team 
concluded that, if the rig crew had 
diverted mud flow to the overboard 
discharge line rather than to the mud 
gas separator, the consequences of the 
event would have been reduced. 
5 
 
Blowout 
emergency 
response  
The emergency response   
procedure that should be developed 
jointly by the management and the 
operator to be used in case of well 
blowout was requested.  
Such document was not received at 
the time of investigation.  
6 Containment 
Events stated do not support a 
conclusion that action was taken to 
shut the well in the shortest possible 
time, as required by the documents 
governing the drilling operation, 
following the sequence for shutting 
down a well when either tripping or 
drilling. 
In the opinion of the investigating 
team, despite the guidance provided in 
the documents governing the drilling 
operation, wellbore monitoring did 
not identify the influx until after 
hydrocarbons were in the riser, and the 
subsequent action taken prior to the 
explosion suggests the rig crew was 
not sufficiently prepared to manage an 
escalating well control situation.  
 
The inherent variability effects that shaped operators’ actions and observations in the context of events 
are used in CPCs’ effect level evaluations. The evaluations listed in Table 3 have been conducted in a 
way in which 1) if there is direct evidence from Table 2 supporting a particular effect level of CPCs, 
then a 100% degree of belief is assigned accordingly, 2) if there is no evidence or relevant information 
available to support the evaluation with respect to a particular effect level of CPCs, then average degrees 
of belief are assigned across all the effect levels to reflect the unknown situation, and 3) if it is irrelevant 
to the effect, (x) is applied.  Given the functional assessment attributes are exclusive factors influencing 
the effect level of the CPCs, their evaluations can be considered as pieces of evidence to support the 
performance of the CPCs, the ER algorithm (i.e. Eqs 3-13) is used to synthesise them to obtain the 
effect levels of the 9 CPCs within the context of the Deepwater Horizon case. The intelligent decision 
system (IDS) software (Yang and Xu, 2002) is used to aggregate the evaluated degrees of belief of each 
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functional assessment attribute to obtain the unconditional probabilities of their associated CPCs’ effect 
levels, as shown in Table 4.  
Table 3. Evaluation of functional assessment attributes affecting CPCs’ effect levels/descriptors 
CPCs  Levels/descriptors 
Functional assessment attributes  
T
as
k
 
re
sp
o
n
si
b
il
it
ie
s 
P
re
p
ar
at
io
n
 
P
re
v
en
ti
o
n
 
D
et
ec
ti
o
n
 
E
m
er
g
en
cy
 
re
sp
o
n
se
 
C
o
n
ta
in
m
en
t 
Adequacy of 
organisation  
CPC 1  
Very Efficient 0 0 0 0 25 0 
Efficient 0 0 0 0 25 0 
Inefficient 0 0 100 100 25 0 
Deficient 100 100 0 0 25 100 
Working conditions  
CPC 2   
Advantageous x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Compatible x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Incompatible x 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 
Adequacy of MMI and 
operational support  
CPC 3 
Supportive x x 0 0 25 0 
Adequate x x 0 0 25 0 
Tolerable x x 50 50 25 0 
Inappropriate x x 50 50 25 100 
Availability of 
procedures/plans  
CPC 4 
Appropriate 0 0 0 0 33.3 100 
Acceptable 100 0 100 100 33.3 0 
Inappropriate 0 100 0 0 33.4 0 
Number of 
simultaneous goals  
CPC 5 
Fewer than capacity x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
Matching current capacity x 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 
More than capacity x 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 33.4 
Available time  
CPC 6 
Adequate x 100 100 100 33.3 33.3 
Temporarily inadequate x 0 0 0 33.3 33.3 
Continuously inadequate x 0 0 0 33.4 33.4 
Time of day (circadian 
rhythm)  
CPC 7 
Day-time (6:00-18:00hr) (adjusted) x 33.3 50 50 33.3 50 
Night(17:00-24:00hr) (unadjusted) x 33.3 50 50 33.3 50 
Night-time(0:00-7:00hr) (unadjusted) x 33.3 0 0 33.4 0 
Adequacy of training 
and expertise  
CPC 8 
Adequate, high experience 33.3 33.3 0 0 33.3 0 
Adequate, limited experience 33.3 33.3 0 0 33.3 0 
Inadequate 33.4 33.4 100 100 33.4 100 
Crew collaboration 
quality  
CPC 9 
Very efficient 25 25 0 0 25 0 
Efficient 25 25 0 0 25 0 
Inefficient 25 25 0 0 25 0 
Deficient 25 25 100 100 25 100 
 
Table 4. CPCs effect levels/descriptors and the assigned degrees of belief aggregation with IDS 
CPCs  Level/descriptors 
Functional assessment attributes 
aggregated  degrees of belief 
Adequacy of organisation  
CPC 1  
Very Efficient 3.51 
Efficient 3.51 
Inefficient 57.09 
Deficient 35.89 
Working conditions  
CPC 2   
Advantageous 33.33 
Compatible 33.33 
Incompatible 33.34 
Adequacy of MMI and operational 
support  
CPC 3 
Supportive 5.18 
Adequate 5.18 
Tolerable 29.52 
Inappropriate 60.12 
Availability of procedures/plans  
CPC 4 
Appropriate 19.95 
Acceptable 60.10 
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Inappropriate 19.95 
Number of simultaneous goals  
CPC 5 
Fewer than capacity 33.33 
Matching current capacity 33.33 
More than capacity 33.34 
Available time  
CPC 6 
Adequate 78.82 
Temporarily inadequate 10.59 
Continuously inadequate 10.59 
Time of day (circadian rhythm)  
CPC 7 
Day-time (6:00-18:00hr) (adjusted) 36.25 
Night(17:00-24:00hr) (unadjusted) 49.13 
Night-time(0:00-7:00hr) 
(unadjusted) 
14.62 
Adequacy of training and expertise 
CPC 8 
Adequate, high experience 14.01 
Adequate, limited experience 14.01 
Inadequate 71.98 
Crew collaboration quality 
CPC 9 
Very efficient 6.43 
Efficient 6.43 
Inefficient 6.43 
Deficient 80.70 
4.3 Calculate the CPTs in two BNs for the best and worst scenarios  
The use of the ER algorithm in the formation of CPTs in BN with incomplete information (e.g. 
subjective judgements) is demonstrated in this part. To obtain the information needed for constructing 
the CPT of the COCOM-CMs node (i.e. the node of human action performance at the top of Figure 2), 
three maritime experts 𝐸𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, 3) with significant domain knowledge were interviewed to provide 
their subjective elicitation on the evaluation grades of the COCOM-CMs in terms of conditional degrees 
of belief as defined by Eq. 1. Three offshore/marine engineers provided their input data within the 
context of marine engineering operations. The careful selection of the representative experts within 
the maritime industry is conducted to reduce the bias involved in the subjective judgements. 
Each of the three selected experts has over 15-year working experience on board offshore rigs 
or commercial ships and holds a high position in his/her companies. This contributes to the 
high quality of the initial data from experts. According to the collected feedback (i.e. Table 5), 
the initial judgements of the three experts keep a very high consistency, which proves that the 
judgements are at large in harmony and the data quality is assured.  Their inputs are listed in 
Table 5.  
Table 5. Elicitation of evaluation grades’ conditional degrees of belief for the three attributes, O, W and A 
R 
𝐸1 𝐸2 𝐸3 
𝐷1,1 𝐷2,1 𝐷3,1 𝐷4,1 𝐷1,2 𝐷2,2 𝐷3,2 𝐷4,2 𝐷1,3 𝐷2,3 𝐷3,3 𝐷4,3 
𝐵1,1 𝐵2,1 𝐵3,1 𝐵4,1 𝐵1,2 𝐵2,2 𝐵3,2 𝐵4,2 𝐵1,3 𝐵2,3 𝐵3,3 𝐵4,3 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 0 0.1 0.8 0 0 0.2 0.8 
3 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.3 0.7 
4 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.4 0.6 
5 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0 0 0.3 0.6 0 0 0.7 0.3 
6 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0 0 0.4 0.5 0 0.2 0.8 0 
7 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0 0 0.4 0.6 
8 0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0.2 0.4 0.3 0 0 0.7 0.3 
9 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.6 0 0 
10 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0.1 0.8 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 
11 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
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12 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0 0.2 0.7 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 
13 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0.3 0.6 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 
14 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.1 0 0.5 0.4 0 0.3 0.7 0 0 
15 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0 0.5 0.4 0 0.2 0.8 0.4 0 
16 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0.6 0.3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
17 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0 0.7 0.2 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
18 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0 0.8 0.1 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
18 0 0 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 
20 0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 
21 0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0 0 0.4 0.6 0 
22 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
23 0.2 0.4 0.4 0 0.6 0.3 0 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
24 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0.7 0.20 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
25 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
26 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
27 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.9 0 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 0 
 
Due to the similar seniority of the three experts, equal weight was assigned to each expert when 
synthesising their judgements using the ER algorithm. Taking Rule No. 7 in Table 5 as an example, the 
first two assessments by 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 are synthesised, as presented in Appendix A. In a similar way, the 
result of combining three experts’ judgements can be obtained by synthesising the combination of the 
first two assessments (as one set) with the third assessment (expert 𝐸3) using the same algorithm. It is 
worth noting that judgements from other experts can be also combined when more feedback from a 
wider range of interview is collected in future research. Consequently, the synthesised human action 
control modes’ degrees of belief 𝐵𝑗  for the 7
th rule are Strategic (𝐵1) = 0, Tactical (𝐵2) = 0.0252, 
Opportunistic (𝐵3) = 0.3271  and Scrambled (𝐵4) =  0.5713. The results reveal that an unknown mass 
of 0.0744 is involved in the 7th rule due to the expert judgements. Windows based IDS software was 
developed to simplify the above calculation process by Yang (2001). It is used to synthesise the basic 
attributes 𝐸𝑖 of Rule 7 with the same result obtained. IDS is also used in synthesising the other combined 
degrees of belief (or probabilities) listed in Table 5. 
Although the ER algorithm is used to synthesise experts’ combined degrees of belief mass  𝛽𝑗,  a 
remaining unknown mass  𝛽𝐷 , which is not assigned to any evaluation grades, is also developed. 
Consequently, the remaining unassigned degrees of belief  are assigned back to the best evaluation 
grade “Strategic” and the worst evaluation grade “Scrambled” on all rules. Accordingly, two sets of 
evaluation grades are generated in Table 6 and used as prior probabilities in the generic COCOM BN 
model to calculate HEP estimates. Consequently, there are two BNs models presenting the best and 
worst scenarios.  
Table 6. Synthesised and combined degrees of beliefs of COCOM-CMs evaluation grades  
Rule Strategic 
( 𝐷1) 
Strategic 
( 𝐷1) C 
Unknown 
Tactical 
( 𝐷2) 
Opportunistic 
( 𝐷3) 
Scrambled 
( 𝐷4) 
Scrambled 
( 𝐷4) C 
Unknown 
Unknown 
1 0 0.0211 0 0 0.9789 1 0.0211 
2 0 0.0231 0 0.1019 0.8750 0.8981 0.0231 
3 0 0.0244 0 0.1973 0.7783 0.8027 0.0244 
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4 0 0.0248 0 0.2321 0.7431 0.7679 0.0248 
5 0 0.0265 0.0279 0.4316 0.5140 0.5405 0.0265 
6 0 0.0277 0.1220 0.5323 0.3180 0.3457 0.0277 
7 0 0.0744 0.0252 0.3271 0.5713 0.6457 0.0744 
8 0 0.0271 0.1164 0.5282 0.3283 0.3554 0.0271 
9 0.1227 0.1519 0.3910 0.2979 0.1592 0.1884 0.0292 
10 0 0.0274 0.0274 0.4734 0.4718 0.4992 0.0274 
11 0.0295 0.0576 0.4495 0.4045 0.0884 0.1165 0.0281 
12 0.0284 0.0554 0.4394 0.4768 0.0284 0.0554 0.0270 
13 0.0284 0.0555 0.4031 0.4845 0.0569 0.0840 0.0271 
14 0.1525 0.1797 0.5789 0.2126 0.0288 0.0562 0.0274 
15 0.1512 0.1784 0.6164 0.1767 0.0285 0.0557 0.0272 
16 0 0.0271 0.4819 0.4058 0.0852 0.1123 0.0271 
17 0.2159 0.2433 0.5757 0.1809 0 0.0274 0.0274 
18 0.2851 0.3125 0.5695 0.1180 0 0.0274 0.0274 
19 0.0865 0.1153 0.1153 0.2715 0.4979 0.5267 0.0288 
20 0.0855 0.114 0.4205 0.3457 0.1198 0.1483 0.0285 
21 0.1125 0.1406 0.3815 0.4188 0.0591 0.0872 0.0281 
22 0.1758 0.2343 0.3223 0.2822 0.1612 0.2198 0.0586 
23 0.5278 0.5817 0.2997 0.1186 0 0.0539 0.0539 
24 0.6370 0.6635 0.2810 0.0555 0 0.0265 0.0265 
25 0.4437 0.4719 0.3803 0.1182 0.0296 0.0578 0.0282 
26 0.6753 0.7016 0.2432 0.0552 0 0.0263 0.0263 
27 0.8153 0.8397 0.1603 0 0 0.0244 0.0244 
 
The CPT of the COCOM-CMs node in the BN presenting the best scenario can be obtained by taking 
into account the values of (D1)C, (D2), (D3) and (D4), while the one for the worst scenarios is 
associated with the set of {(D1), (D2), (D3) and (D4)C} (See Table 6). For instance, in Rule 1 in Table 
6, if O is inappropriate, W is inappropriate, and A is inappropriate, then COCOM-CMs are {0.0211 
Strategic, 0 Tactical, 0 Opportunistic, 0.9789 Scrambled} in the best scenario; and {0 Strategic, 0 
Tactical, 0 Opportunistic, 1 Scrambled} in the worst scenario. As a result, the two BNs for the best and 
worst scenarios are constructed and presented in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. 
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Figure 3: BN model displaying human COCOM-CMs’ posterior probabilities based on the best possible set of 
evaluation grades 
  
 
Figure 4: BN model displaying human COCOM-CMs’ posterior probabilities based on the worst possible set of 
evaluation grades 
4.4 Quantification of human error in the Deepwater Horizon case 
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The evaluations of the CPCs’ effect levels in Table 4 are used as input observations of root cause nodes 
in the two established BN models in Figures 3 and 4. The posterior probabilities of the two assessment 
models’ evaluation grades and their transformed respective HEP results are shown in Table 7. During 
this process, Eq. 14 is used to calculate the lower and upper limits of the HEP interval from the best and 
worst scenarios. The result shows that the HEP estimates in the case are from 14.83% to 15.94%1.  
Finally, HEPs are presented in a utility interval rather than a crisp value. Such an interval could be used 
effectively to specify the uncertainty involved in the assessment. However, for a ranking purpose, a 
crisp value of the HEP interval can be calculated as 0.1547 using Eq. 15, as presented in Table 7. The 
result indicates a control mode of ‘opportunistic’ according to the values of probability of action failure 
defined in the CREAM methodology (See Table 8). 
Table 7. Final HEPs of both assessed scenarios 
Conditions HEP/time 
1.The worst scenario BN aggregated COCOM-CMs 
probability and their transformed highest HEP 
0.0838×0.000224 + 0.201× 0.01+ 0.281× 
0.0708+0.435×0.316 
= 0.1594 
2. The  best scenario BN aggregated COCOM-CMs 
probability and their transformed lowest HEP 
0.119×0.000224 + 0.201× 0.01+ 0.281× 
0.0708+0.40×0.316 
= 0.1483 
The highest and lowest values of HEPs interval 0.1483  ≤HEP ≤0.1594 
The HEP crisp value (e.g. α = 0.5) 0.1547 
 
Table 8. The control modes and probability intervals (Hollnagel, 1998) 
 
Control mode Probability interval 
Strategic 0.5×10−5 < p < 1×10−2 
Tactical 1×10−3 < p < 1×10−1 
 Opportunistic 1×10−2 < p < 0.5×100 
Scrambled 1×10−1 < p < 1×100 
 
4.5 Comparative analysis and discussion of the results 
                                                 
1 Such HEPs are subject to the assignment of the utility values of the four control modes. Although the utility values are cited 
from the work from a leading journal (i.e. Ocean Engineering), further verification of such utility values is still required to 
fully validate the significance of the HEP values in terms of precise risk analysis. Having said that, it is believed that the 
obtained HEP values can be effectively used for risk prioritisation.  
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Based on the identified relevant practices, procedures, and expectations of rig crew’s actions from the 
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report (as presented in Table 5), the traditional CREAM 
and fuzzy CREAM methods are applied in the same case study for the quantification of human error in 
HRA. It allows for a more practical and effective investigation of the applicability of the proposed 
model through a comparative analysis. In this subsection, we mainly focus on the comparison of their 
pros and cons in the real-life applications, as well as the similarity and difference of results obtained 
from different methods. Thus, detailed information on how to conduct these CREAM-based methods 
is not omitted here, and more information can be found in Hollnagel (1998) and Konstandinidou et al. 
(2006) for further reference. The evaluation results from different methods are presented and compared 
in Table 9. 
Table 9. Comparison of the results obtained from different methods 
 
Methods 
CREAM Fuzzy CREAM ER-BN CREAM 
Control mode Opportunistic Opportunistic 
Opportunistic/ 
Scrambled 
Probability interval (0.01 , 0.5) (0.01 , 0.5) (0.1483, 0.1594) 
HEP crisp value - 0.1 0.1547 
 
At this stage of validation, it is worthwhile to differentiate the results obtained from different CREAM 
related methods. In this context, the traditional CREAM result is calculated based on CPCs’ evaluation 
scores improved and reduced (1, 7); the plotting of these scores on the graph shown in Figure 1 reveals 
the result of opportunistic control mode and its related generic probability interval. It only provides a 
wide failure rate interval. Without a crisp value of HEP, it is not even suitable for screening in practical 
applications. The result generated by the fuzzy model, which can be expressed in the form of a crisp 
number, can be used directly in fault tree and event tree calculations for the quantification of specific 
undesired events. However, it also suffers from the problem of failing to incorporate the uncertainties 
in data (e.g. incomplete information) involved during the assessment. Besides, altogether 46656 fuzzy 
rules are included in the proposed fuzzy model (Konstandinidou et al., 2006), which, due to its 
complexity, inevitably hinders its industrial applications. In the proposed ER-BN CREAM model, the 
final calculation of HEP is 0.1547 failure/time; this HEP inclusively lies within the range of original 
opportunistic mode in CREAM (0.1 < HEP < 0.5), revealing the accuracy of the result. However it 
improves the accuracy of the HEP interval from [0.01, 0.5] to [0.1483, 0.1594] with a HEP crispy value 
of 0.1547. Comparing the results with those obtained from other approaches, obviously, the specified 
HEP would provide a more accurate result with a better resolution that will enable an assessor to develop 
a rational preventative plan. 
By changing the BN mode, it has been found that CPC8 (adequate training and expertise to 
100% with respect to all functional assessment attributes) has the most significant impact on 
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the reduction of the HEP. Theoretically, such an analysis can provide scientific support on 
which CPC(s) should be better controls in the recommendations for avoidance of similar 
accidents in future. From a perspective of capability and competency, it is suggested to deepen the 
capabilities of personnel in key operational and leadership positions and augment existing knowledge 
and proficiency in management deep-water drilling and wells operations. Also, advanced deep-water 
well control programs that supplement current industry and regulatory training need to be developed 
(BP, 2010). With respect to the training and exercises of emergency response, the organization is 
suggested to motivate personnel to discuss safety-related concerns of the emergency drills and exercises 
to increase personnel’s skills in the emergency. It is also important for organizations and personnel to 
regularly check the emergency equipment and procedures associated with their capacities, arrangement, 
and performance standards during the emergency drills and exercises (Norazahar et al., 2014).  
5. Contribution and implication 
The major contributions of the generated methods and models in this paper are explained from both 
practical and theoretical aspects. Practically, the uses of the BN inference and FRB structure can 
effectively help to forecaste the high HEPs of hazardous situations and send an early warning signal to 
prevent maritime accidents. Accordingly, the used techniques would provide the potential for 
identifying the most influencing CPC(s) and the associated functional assessment attributes (e.g. 
initiating events or root causes), to develop the risk control options effectively. In addition, using the 
ER algorithm for synthesising expert’s judgments for Bayesian subjective probability elicitation is able 
to enhance CREAM based HRA methodology, which will facilitate the application of relevant methods 
in human performance reliability analysis in maritime and offshore domains where expert judgements 
are usually involved due to the lack of reliable data in maritime safety assessment. Theoretically, both 
BN probabilistic inference and ER synthesising capabilities are used to represent and process context 
knowledge and uncertainty. The combination provides a feasible solution to subjective elicitation of 
CPT in BN applications.  
The developed methods possess enormous potential as valuable aids and effective alternatives to retain 
and improve human performance in marine engineering operations. It has the potential and flexibility 
to be tailored to handle the incompleteness of subjective data when using BNs to aid decision-making 
in other sectors. 
6. Conclusion  
ER’s synthesising and aggregation capability has enlarged the scope of a BN mechanism inference 
viability in describing and handling uncertain information in an engineering operation context. By using 
the concept of degrees of belief, the ER-BN combination can model context knowledge incompleteness 
and ignorance explicitly at any BN assessment level. Combining degrees of ignorance with the best and 
worst evaluation grades can generate two BNs to describe the best and worst scenarios of COCOM-
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CMs’ probabilities. Subsequently, their results are transformed and presented in HEP intervals, where 
each could be further converted into a crisp HEP value for a ranking purpose, as demonstrated in the 
above case study. Consequently, a new hybrid ER-BN method is developed capable of handling the 
problems to which the traditional methods lack the ability to provide appropriate solutions. Applying it 
in HRA facilities the assessment of HEPs through the established CREAM BN generic model in a 
situation where incomplete subjective probability elicitation is necessary.  
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Appendix A 
To calculate the basic conditional probability masses 
i
jm  as defined by Eq. 2.  
𝑚1
1
 = 0.333 × 0 = 0; 𝑚2
1 = 0.333 × 0 = 0; 𝑚3
1 = 0.333 × 0.3 = 0.0999; 𝑚4
1 = 0.333 × 0.7 =
0.2331. 
𝑚1
2 = 0 × 0.333 = 0;  𝑚2
2 = 0.1 × 0.333 = 0.0333;  𝑚3
2 = 0.3 × 0.333 = 0.0999; 𝑚4
2 = 0.3 ×
0.333 = 0.0999. 
𝑚1
3 = 0 × 0.333 = 0; 𝑚2
3 = 0 × 0.333 = 0; 𝑚3
3 = 0.4 × 0.333 = 0.1332; 𝑚4
3 = 0.6 × 0.333 =
0.1998. 
Next the remaining relative importance 
i
Dm   for all  𝑖 = (1, 2, 3) is obtained as follows using Eq. 5 
1
Dm = 1 − 0.333 = 0.667 
2
Dm = 1 − 0.333 = 0.667 
3
Dm = 1 − 0.333 = 0.667. 
The remaining probability mass 
i
Dm
~
  due to the possible incompleteness of any individual grade 
i
j  is 
defined by Eq. 6.  
1~
Dm = 0.333[1 − (0 + 0 + 0.3 + 0.7)] = 0;
 
2~
Dm =
 0.333[1 − (0 + 0.1 + 0.3 + 0.3)] = 0.0999; 
3~
Dm = 0.333[1 − (0 + 0 + 0.4 + 0.6)] = 0
 
The normalizing factor 𝐾𝐶(𝑖+1) for combining the two assessments from 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 is calculated using 
Eq. 11. 
𝐾𝐶(𝑖+1) = [1 − (0 × 0.0333 + 0 × 0.0999 + 0 × 0.0999) + (0 × 0 + 0 × 0.0999 + 0 ×
0.0999)+(0.0999 × 0 + 0.0999 × 0.0333 + 0.0999 × 0.0999) + (0.2331 × 0 + 0.2331 ×
0.0333 + 0.2331 × 0.0999)]−1 = 1.0464. 
The remaining combined probability mass 
)1(~ iC
Dm due to the possible incomplete assessment of 
i
j by 
 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 is defined by Eq. 8. 
)1(~ iC
Dm = 1.0464[(0 × 0.0999) + (0.667 × 0.0999) + (0 × 0.667)] = 0.0697. 
The combined remaining relative importance 
)1( iC
Dm  from the two assessments conducted by 𝐸1 
and 𝐸2 are obtained using Eq. 9.  
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)1( iC
Dm = 1.0464(0.667 × 0.667) = 0.4655. 
To calculate the combined probability mass j , Eq. 12 is employed as follows. 
1 = 1.0464[(0 × 0) + (0 × 0.7669) + (0.667 × 0)] = 0; 
2 = 1.0464[(0 × 0.0333) + (0 × 0.7669) + (0.667 × 0.0333)] = 0.0232;  
3 = 1.0464[(0.0999 × 0.0999) + (0.0999 × 0.7669) + (0.667 × 0.0999)] = 0.1537;  
4 = 1.0464[(0.2331 × 0.0999) + (0.2331 × 0.7669) + (0.667 × 0.0999)] = 0.2698. 
Finally, the remaining combined probability mass 
D  due to the possible incomplete assessment of 
 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 is calculated by Eq. 13. 
D =
0.0697
1−0.4655
= 0.1304.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
